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1. Ontological disputes 
Ontological disputes tend to involve your intuitions 
concerning relations between the statue and the clay, 
between persons and their bodies, those concerning 
personal identity and identity through time.  
Let us suppose for a while that there exists a 
multiplicity of entities and that the ontologist is dealing with 
them. There is a chunk of the matter that I observe. It is a 
body. But the description of the chunk of the matter as a 
body may perhaps be substituted by another description: 
there is a person here. Once a person is mentioned, we 
will tend to be attentive at other things as we were in the 
former case. We will be observing patterns of bodily 
behavior, concerning not just its spatio-temporal position, 
but also patterns involving this body’s acting as a person, 
with its various deeds and with the dynamics in several 
dimensions such as physical, inter-personal and aesthetic 
dimensions that in involves. Now you ask yourself whether 
the person is identical to her body. 
Another couple of examples concerns personal 
identity and identity through time. We ask ourselves 
whether a person is identical to her temporary stages. A 
child and a grown up person do not share much of the 
physical matter, given that the cells and the material from 
which they consist are repeatedly changed as we observe 
them through the passage of time. Almost complete and 
repeated substitution of the matter in a person’s body is 
not diminished in any way because of the gradual nature of 
this substitution. 
What are the conditions for identity 
 Body = Person? 
May person be reduced to her body? There are 
powerful intuitions that this cannot be the case: You cannot 
reduce person to her body. But one may also try to argue 
in the opposed direction. The important thing for our 
discussion is that the dispute does not seem to deal with 
the ultimate entities, but with the relation between two 
descriptions involving the chunk of matter in question. So 
this does not prove to be a debate concerning real entities 
of ultimate ontology. It is rather a dispute about the status 
of connections existing between descriptions of one 
supposedly existing entity. 
The question about personal identity and about the 
identity through time puts under our scrutiny the equation 
 Person = Person’s temporary stages. 
If we again take the chunk of matter under 
question as our starting point, we may recognize the 
dispute to be about two descriptions of this same chunk, 
once taken as the description involving a person, and once 
as the description of the person’s several temporary 
stages. We can conclude that the dispute does not 
concern the chunk of matter in question in any direct 
manner. 
The work of ontologist thus does not directly 
concern the language and mind independently existing 
reality. It deals with and handles intuitions about the 
concepts involved into metaphysical discussion, such as 
concepts relating to the person, to a human body, identity, 
existence and non-existence. It is actually a research into 
the penumbral connections between these concepts. 
There are intuitions relating to what is appropriate to think 
about a case under scrutiny. Counterexamples involving 
conceptual possibilities are produced, trading on relations 
between penumbral connections of the concepts involved. 
If all this is true, then one can conclude that the now 
mentioned disputes happen in the area of descriptive 
metaphysics and not in the area of the real metaphysics. 
Real metaphysics is supposed to deal with the ultimate 
reality that exists irrespective of the linguistic and 
conceptual schemas that are applied to it. Descriptive 
metaphysics is understood here as dealing with description 
of the world. 
Let us take the equation 
 Clay = Statue. 
Your intuitions concerning the equation may be 
pulled in opposite directions, be it in the direction of 
reducibility of the statue to the clay, or in an opposed 
manner, in direction of irreducibility. If you zoom in right 
now at the alternative of reducibility, you will stress the 
prototypical concepts related to the clay, and your intuition 
will follow in this direction. If, on the other hand, you zoom 
in at the properties of the concept “statue”, your overall 
intuitions will turn in another direction, and you will be more 
inclined towards nonreductionist interpretation. 
 
2. Normativity 
The usual belief is that debates in metaphysics 
concern ultimate reality. There cannot be any normativity 
involved into the ultimate reality. But it goes otherwise for 
discussions in which you take part. The reality of these is 
discursive and it certainly involves normativity. Now we 
found out that ontology as practiced does not proceed at 
the level of ultimate reality. Ontologists are not engaged in 
the real metaphysics, but in the descriptive metaphysics. If 
this is the case, then the discourse involving matters 
ontological is in the foreground, and not the area of the 
world as it may exist outside of this discourse. But then it 
will be quite natural to see this ontological discourse 
governed by normative constraints. 
There are two generic possibilities about the 
dynamics involving normative standards. These may be 
either high standards in the sense that they would put 
demanding requirements on the discourse in question. Or 
they may be rather the case of standards that are lower 
and closer to the earth. The proclaimed standards of the 
ontological discourse tend to be high. But this form of 
normativity is contrary both to the practice of ontological 
discourse as it is actually proceeding, and to the nature of 
cognitive systems underlying the ontological discourse in 
question. 
Ontological disputes belong to the area of 
descriptive metaphysics. Accordingly, they involve the 
discourse of metaphysics, and they do not involve the 
mind and language independently existing world in any 
direct manner. Ontological positions are in the offing, and 
the choice seems quite democratic as far as the space of 
logical possibilities is concerned. Your heart may choose 
between nominalism and realism, between anti-realism 
and between several other positions for different areas. 
But once the choice is made, pressure is put on the 
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ontological positions to embrace principles of the following 
sort: 
“For all the relevant cases, accept substance-
accidence distinction as an explanatory principle”. 
“For all the relevant cases, accept tropes as an 
explanatory principle”.  
Relevant cases may include particulars that can be 
understood as spatio-temporal chunks of matter or as 
middle-sized dry goods. You can notice that the first 
mentioned principle offers different and opposed 
interpretative proposals as compared to the second 
principle. According to the first principle, a body will be 
interpreted by application of the substance-accidence 
distinction. Whereas according to the second principle, the 
same body will be interpreted as consisting of tropes, that 
is of spatio-temporally instantiated properties. In this case, 
the nature of the proposed principles will pull interpretation 
in opposed directions, involving intuitions proper to the 
prototypes of concepts “substance-accidence” pair and 
intuitions proper to the prototypes of “trope”, as applied to 
the body under question. Principles thus introduce 
interpretative constraints that may pull intuitions linked to 
the concepts involved into the opposite directions. 
The important thing though is that the principles 
underlying metaphysical discourse are spelled out as 
general principles. Given the relevant domain, such as the 
domain of middle-sized dry goods, they are supposed to 
hold for this domain in a general manner. 
The general form of the principle stated will also be 
in value for the area under question in an exceptionless 
manner. This means that for all the cases of middle sized 
dry goods, in the example above, you will have to apply 
the substance-accidence distinction, even if these would 
be counterintuitive cases as far as your position is 
concerned. Even and especially, you will be obliged to 
spend your time with the limit cases of the sort just 
mentioned, as these will be important for the defense of 
your position and for making it plausible. The 
exceptionless nature of the principles involved is actually a 
consequence of generality of these principles. 
General exceptionless principles also allow for 
projectibility, which is built into them by the fact that they 
are general and exceptionless. If you buy the general 
principle concerning tropes, you will have to reason 
somehow in the following way: “If this chunk of matter is an 
assemblage of tropes, then another similar chunk of matter 
will be assemblage of tropes as well.” More generally: 
tropes will provide patterns that allow projectibility to the 
whole range of further cases, that is to all the cases 
belonging to the domain. This general form of principles is 
there in order to secure tractability. If there is a general 
principle of the mentioned sort, the hope is that it may be 
unambiguously decided for each particular case in the 
domain whether it is a member or whether it isn’t. 
There are two sorts of reasons though that make 
us realize inappropriateness of exceptionless projectible 
general principles as the basis for ontological discourse. 
The first reason relates to the world and the second reason 
relates to the nature of the cognitive system that underlies 
the ontological discourse. In each case, the reasoning will 
be that the domain under question is too rich to be codified 
by the use of exceptionless general principles. 
Neither the rich nature of the mind independently 
existing world, nor the rich nature of cognition that backs 
up the discourse of ontology are appropriate to fit 
exceptionless general ontological principles that are 
explicitly put as guidelines for ontological inquiry by the 
descriptive metaphysicians.  
Ontological descriptive discourse explicitly requires 
tractable principles. But actually this discourse engages 
into conceptual penumbral connections related to the 
disputes it is interested in. Now as the mentioned 
conceptual penumbral connections engage the cognitive 
system, the question arises what kind of normativity would 
be appropriate for the subject matter of the ontological 
normative discourse. We may propose particularist 
normativity to do the job. Dynamical cognition does not buy 
any tractable general principles; rather it accentuates 
richness. The matter under consideration concerns 
concepts, and concepts get realized in the cognitive 
system. According to the hypothesis of dynamical 
cognition there is a rich cognitive intractable background 
where cognitive forces lead to realization of total cognitive 
states, at the mathematical middle level of cognitive 
system’s description. 
 
3. Phenomenology 
It may seem a very peculiar claim to affirm the 
vicinity of qualitative experiences to the metaphysical 
undertaking. The main wrong presupposition of the arguing 
to the contrary figures the belief that ontology or 
metaphysics concerns directly things happening in the 
mind and language independent world. We have 
dismantled this false belief by claiming that the work of 
metaphysician happens in the area of the descriptive, that 
it concerns discourse and intuitions about conceptual 
penumbral connections. If this is right, however, the 
ontology as practiced turns out to be a part and parcel of 
the working of our cognitive systems. But if this is the case 
now, then the intentional thoughts implied into ontological 
work are not just psychological – they are also qualitative. 
So, phenomenology, after all, really turns out to be 
constitutively involved into metaphysics. 
You may ask yourself if there would be anybody to 
hold such a strange view: that metaphysics and 
phenomenology go hand in hand. Intertwining of 
metaphysics and phenomenology was the domain of 
Brentano and of his school. Contrary to Aristotle, Brentano 
required Cartesian kind of evidence to be integrated into 
research of ontological categories. But evidence should be 
understood as qualitative experience that is a precondition 
for each intentional act to happen. It is intrinsic to it and not 
just an accompanying feature. So it turns out that the area 
of metaphysics has phenomenology intrinsically built into 
it.  
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